Tag Archives: Groundwater

GenX in the State Budget

June 18, 2018. Instead of acting on the GenX bill described in an earlier post, the legislature inserted GenX provisions into the state budget bill (Senate Bill 99). The provisions adopted in the budget differ from those in House Bill 972/Senate Bill 724  in several key ways:

♦ The budget provision expressly makes a Governor’s order appealable through an administration hearing. (The earlier post noted that a Governor’s order would likely be appealable under the state’s Administrative Procedures Act even if the bill did not specifically mention appeal rights.)

♦ Language has been added to c;larify that the grant of new enforcement power to the Governor does not prevent DEQ and the Environmental Management Commission from also using their existing enforcement power under other state laws to address PFAS. The new language eliminates confusion about the impact on DEQ’s ongoing enforcement cases against Chemours and confirms that DEQ can still go directly to court in future enforcement cases if necessary.

♦ The budget provision reduces the funds appropriated to the UNC Environmental Policy Collaboratory from $8 million to  just over $5 million and limits the scope of funded water quality research. Instead of supporting non-targeted monitoring for a broad range of unregulated pollutants, the funds could only be used for monitoring of PFAS.

♦ Funding for monitoring of  Cape Fear Public Utility Authority’s water supply has similarly been limited to monitoring for PFAS.

♦ The budget dropped funding  for additional resources in the Department of Health and Human Services to evaluate health risks associated with unregulated  water contaminants. The earlier House and Senate GenX bills had earmarked over $500,000  for DHHS; under the budget bill, DHHS receives no funding for toxicology and epidemiological study of contaminants in North Carolina’s water supply sources.

Funding proposed for DEQ did not change. DEQ  will receive $1.3 million in new funding related to PFAS contamination, although new staff positions created with the funding must be time-limited rather than permanent. The budget also provides funding for a mass spectrometer to be used in analyzing water samples for PFAS. The budget provision, however,  specifies a particular type of mass spectrometer that does not have as much technical capacity to identify other unregulated contaminants as DEQ had recommended.

The budget provision continues to require a person (or company) responsible for PFAS contamination to provide an alternative water source to the well owner.  The responsibility only exists if releases of the pollutant caused the well contamination. Requiring a causal connection between the pollution release and the well contamination follows the approach taken under existing state groundwater protection rules.  It is different from  2016 coal ash legislation that required Duke Energy to provide alternative water supply to well owners within a 1/2 mille perimeter around every coal ash pond even if coal ash disposal had not been proven to be the cause of the well contamination.

What do the changes mean?  Since the new Governor’s authority can trigger an administrative appeal  (which may  take a year or more to reach a final decision), it doesn’t provide a more direct or effective remedy than DEQ’s existing authority to request a court order. As a result, it isn’t likely the new authority will be used often if at all.

Narrowing the focus of the water quality monitoring funded through the UNC Environmental Policy Collaboratory to PFAS has a mixed effect. Investigation of  PFAS contamination will receive more resources, but none of the appropriated funds will go to identification of other unregulated contaminants in N.C. water supplies.

Removal of the DHHS funding leaves the department with extremely limited staff resources to evaluate human health risk when regulatory agencies or researchers identify a new unregulated contaminant in a water supply source.

Status. Governor Cooper vetoed the budget bill on several grounds. The House and Senate have overridden the veto, allowing the bill — including the revised GenX provisions — to  become law.

GenX Legislation and Unintended Consequences

May 18, 2018. Yesterday, the N.C. House and Senate introduced identical bills in another attempt to legislatively address the impact of GenX (a perflourinated compound) on the Cape Fear River and drinking water wells. See an earlier post for background on the GenX issue. In September of 2017,  the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) filed a lawsuit against  The Chemours Company under existing water quality laws and reached a partial consent order that requires Chemours to end all wastewater discharges of GenX to the river from its Fayetteville facility.  The consent order reserves DEQ’s right to ask the court to order Chemours to take additional actions related to GenX groundwater contamination and other violations. DEQ has also reviewed Chemours’ air emissions, which may be another source of  surface and groundwater contamination as GenX  returns to the ground in rainwater. Based on monitoring results, DEQ  has notified Chemours  of an intent to modify the plant’s air quality permit. Copies of documents related to the enforcement actions  can be found on DEQ’s Chemours enforcement webpage.

The two new bills, House Bill 972 and Senate Bill 724, appropriate money to address GenX and other per- and poly-fluoroalkyl substances (PFAS),  but also change environmental enforcement law and require specific steps to address GenX groundwater contamination.   This post focuses on the possible unintended consequences of provisions in the bill that affect environmental enforcement and remediation.

Section 1 of each bill creates a specific enforcement provision for contamination caused by GenX or other PFAS by adding a new paragraph to an existing enforcement law, G.S. 143-215.3,    authorizing  the Governor to order a facility to stop operations resulting in release of GenX or other PFAS. Although the intent may be to provide a quick response to PFAS pollution, the provision may actually slow or undercut DEQ’s ability to pursue enforcement actions against Chemours or a future source of PFAS pollution.

Under existing water and air quality laws,  DEQ can direct a facility to stop an illegal wastewater discharge or emission of air pollutants by issuing a Notice of Violation or compliance letter. If the violator fails to comply within the time allowed or DEQ believes the violation creates an imminent threat, DEQ can file a lawsuit and ask for a court-enforced  injunction requiring compliance.  Last year, DEQ used that authority (see G.S. 143-215.6C)  to file an action in superior court against Chemours. The lawsuit has already resulted in a partial consent order to  end all wastewater discharges of GenX to the Cape Fear River. Since then, DEQ has continued to investigate the scope of GenX groundwater contamination and has issued compliance letters to Chemours requiring initial steps to address sources of groundwater contamination (such as stormwater drainage). DEQ has the ability to go back to court if Chemours fails to follow through. As the permitting agency DEQ can also address both water and air quality impacts by changing the terms of the Chemours’ permits. DEQ has already notified Chemours of the department’s intent to modify the facility’s air quality permit, presumably to reduce air emissions of GenX.

The new  provision in H972 and S724 would allow the Governor to issue an administrative order to shut down releases of GenX or other PFAS. On its face, a Governor’s order sounds like a quicker and more direct way to stop the release of these pollutants. In reality, any order could be appealed in an administrative hearing and the administrative law judge has the power to prevent  the order from going into effect until there has been a final decision on the appeal. Although the bills don’t mention the possibility of an administrative appeal, the state’s Administrative Procedures Act (APA) creates that right. (See G.S. 150B-23 for the law on appealing state actions.)  An administrative appeal can take as much as a year, slowing enforcement.  Under existing water and air quality enforcement laws, DEQ can go directly to court for an injunction instead of issuing an order potentially leading to an administrative appeal hearing.

The new provision  raises questions about both the path forward on existing Chemours enforcement actions and the impact on future state enforcement actions in response to release of  PFAS from other facilities.

With respect to DEQ’s ongoing Chemours enforcement actions, one question is whether the  legislature intends the new provision to be the exclusive remedy for Chemours’ violations, overriding DEQ’s ability to go directly to the courts for an injunction. In the absence of clear legislative language to the contrary, courts can interpret more recent and more specific laws to override earlier and more general laws.  The risk would be that a court may interpret the new enforcement provision specifically addressing PFAS pollution to override existing  but more general water/air quality enforcement laws.  At the very least, the legislation needs to be clear about the relationship between the Governor’s new power and DEQ’s existing authority to go directly to court for an injunction.  If the new provision becomes the only enforcement path, the legislation could slow rather than accelerate enforcement against Chemours.

There may also be a need to harmonize the Governor’s power with DEQ’s permitting authority under the Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act.  An order affecting wastewater discharges or permitted air emissions will likely require modification of facility permits. Under federal delegations of permitting authority to DEQ,  significant modification of a permit usually triggers requirements for public notice and EPA review.

The new provision also limits issuance of a Governor’s order in several ways that don’t apply when DEQ exercises its existing water quality and air quality enforcement authority:

♦  An order could only be issued for a  facility that has an NPDES (wastewater discharge) permit.  The order could not be used for a completely unpermitted source or to address air emissions causing PFAS  pollution if the source doesn’t  also have an NPDES permit.

♦ An order could not be issued  unless the facility had received more than one Notice of Violation in the previous two years.

♦ DEQ has to make  efforts to eliminate the unauthorized discharges for at least a year before an order can be issued.

The conditions were clearly written to cover Chemours. But if a PFAS pollution problem arises at another facility, the provision could hamstring DEQ’s ability to act unless and until all three  conditions have been met. Again, this creates a significant problem if the new provision becomes the only enforcement remedy for addressing PFAS pollution.

Many of the concerns raised by Section 1 could be addressed by clarifying that existing environmental enforcement laws/rules implemented by DEQ continue to apply, making the new provision an additional tool rather than the only remedy for PFAS pollution. Even then, it may  be necessary to provide guidance on how issuance of a Governor’s order affects both pending and future DEQ enforcement actions under those existing laws.

This section of H972 and S724  has a sunset date of December 31, 2020, which means it would be automatically repealed on that date unless the legislature acts to extend it.

Sec.4(a) Directs DEQ to develop a plan to assess and remediate groundwater and surface water contamination associated with PFAS. Again, the legislation doesn’t explain how the provision affects DEQ’s existing authority especially with respect to groundwater contamination. State groundwater rules require the person who caused the contamination to develop under DEQ supervision – and pay for – a plan to assess and remediate groundwater contamination. The bill language does not mention state groundwater rules or the polluter’s responsibility for assessment and remediation; it appears to put the entire responsibility for an assessment and remediation plan on DEQ.   This is likely another unintended result that could be fixed by cross-referencing  existing rules describing the polluter’s responsibility for assessment and remediation.

As a practical matter,  this is a bigger issue for groundwater assessment and remediation than for surface water pollution.  DEQ can often assess surface water impacts by taking in-stream samples and eliminate the impact by simply stopping or reducing the discharge.   Determining the extent of groundwater contamination and implementing a groundwater cleanup plan can be much more time, labor and money-intensive.

One other note.  Section 2 of the bill authorizes DEQ to order a person responsible for contaminating a drinking water well with GenX or another PFAS to provide a permanent alternative water supply to the well owner. The language looks very similar to the alternative water supply  provision in 2016 coal ash legislation.   The difference: the coal ash provision required Duke Energy to provide an alternative water supply  to every well owner within 1/2 mile of a coal ash impoundment; the GenX provision applies to individual wells on a case by case basis.  DEQ would need to order Chemours to provide alternative water supply to an individual well owner based on data linking the well contamination to Chemours as the source.  Again, the GenX provision doesn’t mention existing state groundwater rules that already require the person who caused groundwater contamination to  “mitigate any hazards resulting from exposure to the pollutants” and restore groundwater to meet state standards.  (15A NCAC 2L.0106).  On a quick review, the GenX alternative water supply provision seems to be consistent with  existing state groundwater rules but does not necessarily provide a speedier path to alternative water supply.  In either case, the burden is on the state to establish the cause and effect link between Chemours’ activity and contamination of individual wells.

GenX: The State Enforcement Case

November 14, 2017.  An earlier post discussed some of the issues surrounding detection of a perflourinated compound known as GenX  in the Cape Fear River and in water systems using the river as a drinking water source. On September 7, 2017, the  Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ)  issued a Notice of Violation and filed a legal complaint against the Chemours Company alleging violations of the federal Clean Water Act and state groundwater rules related to GenX. This post looks at the specific allegations in the state enforcement case.  ( A copy of the entire complaint can be found on  DEQ’s GenX  webpage.)

One piece of background information —  Dupont  began manufacturing GenX at the Fayetteville Works in 2009, but transferred the operation and associated environmental permits to the Chemours Company in 2015.  The sequence of events surrounding GenX begins under Dupont management, but the enforcement case names only the Chemours Company — the current owner and permit holder — as defendant.

The enforcement case against Chemours makes two basic claims:

1. Chemours violated the Clean Water Act by discharging GenX to the Cape Fear River under a water quality permit that did not authorize any discharge of GenX.  The state claims neither Dupont nor Chemours  told DEQ that wastewater discharged from the Fayetteville Works to the Cape Fear River would contain GenX and other perflourinated compounds.   According to the complaint,  state water quality staff  understood that the GenX manufacturing plant opened in 2009 would use a “closed loop” system and dispose of all wastewater off-site.   In fact,  a consent agreement between the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Dupont under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)  only allowed manufacture of GenX  under conditions requiring Dupont to effectively eliminate GenX from both the wastewater discharge and air emissions associated with the manufacturing process.

The complaint alleged that Chemours,  in applying for its most recent National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit under the Clean Water Act,  did not tell DEQ that other operations at the Fayetteville Works generated wastewater containing GenX as a byproduct. (The implication is that Dupont had also failed to disclose the presence of GenX  as a byproduct when applying for earlier water quality permits.) Chemours discharged wastewater from those operations to the Cape Fear River.

DEQ alleges Chemours violated the Clean Water Act by failing to tell state permit writers that  wastewater from the Fayetteville Works contained GenX (and other perflourinated compounds) and by discharging GenX  to the Cape Fear River under an NPDES permit that did not authorize discharge of those compounds.

2. Chemours  violated state groundwater standards.    According to the DEQ complaint,   Chemours’ hazardous waste permit has required groundwater monitoring since at least 2003 and included sampling for PFOA (the older perflourinated compound replaced by GenX ).  After detection of PFOA  in the Cape Fear River in 2015, DEQ required supplemental groundwater monitoring to determine whether groundwater at the Fayetteville Works could be the source. It isn’t clear from the complaint whether the hazardous waste permit required monitoring for PFOA from the beginning and expanded the scope in 2015 or first required PFOA in 2015. DEQ did not specifically require monitoring for GenX until August of 2017. The initial sampling detected GenX in 13 of 14 monitoring wells on the grounds of the Fayetteville Works.

Under state rules, the  groundwater  standard for any contaminant that does not  occur naturally is the lowest measurable level  (the “practical quantification level” or “PQL”) unless the rules set a higher standard based on evaluation of health and environmental risk. Since GenX does not occur naturally and state rules set no other standard, the allowable concentration of GenX would be the PQL of 10 nanograms/liter (equivalent to 10 parts per billion).  The 2017 monitoring detected levels of GenX ranging from 519 ng/ltr to 61,300 ng/ltr. All five wells located adjacent to the Cape Fear River had levels of GenX exceeding 11,800 ng/ltr. DEQ found the test results documented widespread groundwater contamination on the Fayetteville Works site exceeding  both the 10 ng/ltr groundwater standard and the threshold for human health effects  identified by the state Dept. of Health and Human Services (140 ng/ltr level).

Status of the enforcement case.  The DEQ complaint asked, in part, that Chemours immediately stop any discharge of GenX and related compounds to the Cape Fear River.  On September 8, 2017 (the day after filing the enforcement case), DEQ entered into an agreement with Chemours to resolve the discharge issue. Under a partial consent agreement,  Chemours agreed to continue voluntary measures undertaken early in the summer to prevent discharge of process wastewater containing GenX to the Cape Fear River.  The partial consent agreement also required Chemours to take similar steps to prevent discharge of two other perflourinated compounds from the “single source of significance” of those compounds at the Fayetteville Works.

The partial consent agreement did not resolve all potential violations at the Fayetteville Works.  The consent agreement did not address any of the groundwater standard violations alleged in DEQ’s September 7, 2017 complaint. DEQ also expressly reserved the right to take additional enforcement action in the event of future unpermitted discharges or violations associated with other chemicals. In fact, DEQ issued a new Notice of Violation to Chemours today based on a previously unreported spill at the Fayetteville Works. That NOV  alleges that Chemours violated its NPDES permit by failing to notify DEQ of an October 6, 2017 spill of dimer acid flouride ( a precursor to GenX) from the manufacturing line.

Still to come. With respect to the groundwater violations, DEQ’s September complaint asked the court to order Chemours to:

♦ Remove, treat or control any source of perflourinated compounds at the Fayetteville Works that could contribute to groundwater contamination. Consistent with state groundwater rules, that  would need to be done under a plan approved by DEQ.

♦ Fully assess the extent of groundwater contamination and develop a plan to address the groundwater contamination. (Again, both the assessment and corrective action plans would be subject to DEQ approval).

It does not appear that Chemours has an approved groundwater assessment plan yet and the groundwater corrective action plan can only be developed once the assessment has been done. In the meantime, DEQ has directed Chemours to provide an alternative source of drinking water to 50 households near the Fayetteville Works whose water supply wells have been contaminated by perflourinated compounds.

DEQ’s September complaint focused on actions necessary to stop the  discharge of GenX to the Cape Fear River and address groundwater contamination,  but state law also authorizes DEQ to assess civil penalties for these violations. The maximum civil penalty for each violation of state water quality laws or rules is $25,000 and if a violation continues over a period of time, state law  authorizes DEQ to assess daily penalties.  (N.C. General Statute 143-215.6A.) The actual penalty amount per violation depends on a number of factors set out in the law, including the extent of harm and whether the violation was intentional. In the case of a continuing violation, DEQ would also have to decide what time period merits daily penalties. DEQ usually develops the penalty assessment separately from legal action to obtain compliance and has not yet proposed penalties for the Chemours violations.

Changing Cleanup Standards for Leaking USTs

Oct. 26, 2016. In June, the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) released new guidance on remediation of groundwater contamination caused by leaking petroleum underground storage tanks (USTs). The guidance document significantly changes the approach to remediation of  high risk UST sites. Under rules adopted by the Environmental Management Commission (EMC), groundwater contamination at high risk UST sites must be remediated to meet state groundwater quality standards if that is feasible. 15A NCAC 2L.0407(b).

The new guidance directs environmental consultants to assume the cleanup standard for most high risk sites will be  “Gross Contaminant Levels”, which represent contamination at  levels  as much as 1000 X the  groundwater protection or drinking water standards. The guidance raises a number of questions about the impact of more limited cleanup on groundwater and property owners; consistency with EMC rules; and whether the new guidance should have gone through rulemaking  to allow for public comment and adoption by the EMC.

UST Rules. The UST program operates under “risk-based” remediation  rules  that allow less groundwater remediation on sites posing a low risk to public health, safety and the environment and require more extensive remediation on high risk sites.  Existing UST rules require petroleum-contaminated sites to be classified as high, intermediate or low risk based on site conditions and assign a cleanup standard to each risk classification. High risk sites must be remediated to meet the state’s groundwater protection standards to the extent feasible. The groundwater standards set limits  for individual contaminants at the level safe for unrestricted use of the groundwater  — including use as a drinking water supply. Intermediate risk UST sites only have to be remediated to “Gross Contaminant Levels”, which allow contamination at levels as much as 1000 X  the groundwater protection standard or drinking water standard to remain at the end of remediation. Low risk sites may not require any remediation even though contaminant levels  greatly exceed groundwater protection standards.

Under existing rules adopted by the Environmental Management Commission, UST risk classifications are based on a snapshot of conditions around the petroleum release and the likelihood that petroleum contamination will reach water supply wells or create some other imminent health, safety or environmental hazard.  Under  EMC rules (15A NCAC .0406), a UST site is considered “high risk”  if:

(a)  a water supply well… has been contaminated by the release or discharge;
(b)  a drinking water well is located within 1000 feet of the contamination source;
(c)  a water supply well not used for drinking water is located within 250 feet of the source;
(d)  the groundwater within 500 feet of the contamination source could be a future water supply source because there is no other source of water supply;
(e)  the vapors from the discharge or release pose a serious threat of explosion due to accumulation of the vapors in a confined space; or
(f)  the discharge or release poses an imminent danger to public health, public safety, or the environment.

New DEQ guidance on high risk sites. 
North Carolina Petroleum UST Release Corrective Action Phase Project Management: A Calibrated Risk-Based Corrective Action Decision & Implementation Guide, effective June 1, 2016, moves away from the principle of  remediating groundwater at high risk UST sites  to meet state groundwater protection standards.  Instead, the guidance assumes most  sites classified as “high risk” can be remediated only to Gross Contaminant Levels (GCLs).

The guidance document cites data indicating that groundwater contamination plumes contract over time, reducing risk to nearby wells that have not already been contaminated.  Based on state laws directing DEQ to consider factors that limit  risk to nearby wells, DEQ has directed remediation companies to assume older high risk UST sites can be remediated to Gross Contaminant Levels. Under the new guidance, the key factor will be the stability of the contaminant plume. If the plume has stabilized or become sufficiently predictable for DEQ to conclude the contamination does not represent an expanding threat, the cleanup will largely rely on “monitored natural attenuation” of the contamination (natural reduction in contaminant concentrations over time) and the cleanup standard will be based on the GCLs.

A few observations about the new guidance:

♦ The guidance document acknowledges the new remediation guidelines have been driven by a  lack of sufficient state funds to fully remediate even high risk UST sites.

♦ The idea of reviewing high risk classifications based on the age of the site and stability of the plume makes sense, but the new guidance appears to focus on just one risk factor — proximity of the UST’s petroleum release  to existing water supply wells.  The guidance shifts to much more limited cleanup as long as the plume has stabilized and/or alternative water supply is available to well owners affected by petroleum contamination.

The guidance does not appear to consider another factor listed in the Environmental Management Commission’s  risk classification rule — whether groundwater within 500 feet of the UST release may be needed as a future water supply. In areas where groundwater represents the only local water supply source, the EMC risk classification rule intended to protect the groundwater as a potential water supply even in the absence of existing water supply wells.  The new guidance document seems to focus solely on the potential impact to existing wells.

♦  Reliance on GCLs as the final cleanup standard means higher levels of petroleum contamination remain in the groundwater at the completion of remediation. In the absence of extended monitoring, making GCLs the default remediation standard for plumes close to existing water supply wells or in areas where water supply wells may be installed in the future transfers risk from the UST owner to nearby property owners.  UST risk classifications rely on a snapshot of conditions around the petroleum release.  A change in conditions can lower risk (as the guidance document assumes), but conditions can also change in ways that increase risk.  Installation of a new water supply well  or changed  use of an existing well can affect the behavior of the contaminant plume, exposing well users to petroleum contamination.  Given that possibility,  greater monitoring of  high risk sites remediated only to gross contaminant levels may be needed.

♦  Since the guidance document changes implementation of the UST rules,  it likely would be considered a “rule” under the state’s Administrative Procedure Act.  In addition to creating a presumption that  gross contaminant levels will be the cleanup standard for all UST sites — a departure from the existing EMC rule — the guidance document establishes specific triggers for reexamination of an existing site classification. The new DEQ guidance may or may not be good policy, but any policy generally applicable to UST owners and operators would be considered a rule and the Environmental Management Commission has rule-making authority over the UST program. Failure to use the rule-making process also sidesteps any opportunity for comment by UST owners/operators, remediation companies, adjacent property owners or other members of the public on the potential impact of the changes.

♦  The change in UST remediation standards is only the latest step back from protection of groundwater as a water supply resource important to the state’s future.  A significant number of North Carolinians rely on groundwater for water supply either; around 50% of the population drinks water from private water supply wells or well-based water systems. Farms  often rely on water supply wells for irrigation and water supply for animals. In recent years, the direction of state policy has moved consistently toward less remediation of groundwater contamination because of the cost to the state or the cost to the polluter. The question is whether those cost/benefit calculations given enough consideration to the long-term costs of groundwater contamination.

The Ongoing Controversy Over Coal Ash and Well Contamination

August 21, 2016. The controversy over changing state advice to well owners near Duke Energy’s coal ash impoundments has exploded again over conflicting accounts — within the McCrory administration — of the basis for “do not drink” letters sent in 2015 and later withdrawn. Two earlier posts here and here provide background on groundwater and drinking water standards for vanadium and hexavalent chromium (the contaminant of greatest concern).

In 2015, the N.C. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) sent health advisory letters to the owners of wells with concentrations of hexavalent chromium (chromium 6 or Cr-6)  above 0.07 ppb.  The 0.07 ppb threshold represented the concentration of Cr-6 associated with an increased cancer risk of 1:1 million. In early 2016, the McCrory administration rescinded most of the letters and advised well owners that water meeting the federal drinking water standard for total chromium  (100 ppb) should be considered safe to drink. The total chromium standard covers both chromium-3 and the more toxic chromium-6.

Within the last two weeks, the conflict between DHHS and the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) over the content of the health advisory letters  again made headlines. This post describes the roles of  DHHS and DEQ in groundwater contamination incidents; explains the criteria for developing groundwater standards; and makes a few observations on the implications of the conflict for future groundwater contamination incidents.

The role of DHHS in groundwater contamination incidents and development of groundwater standards. When contamination affects drinking water wells,  DHHS toxicologists often advise on the potential health effects. If there is no existing drinking water or groundwater standard for the specific contaminant, the toxicologists use established protocols to assess the contaminant’s short-term  and long-term health effects. Acute health effects include organ damage, skin rashes, respiratory problems and other short to intermediate term problems. Long-term health effects often focus on increased cancer risk. DHHS may also work with the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) to develop a health-based groundwater standard for a contaminant that has no existing numeric standard in state or federal rules.  DHHS toxicologists advise rather than regulate. DEQ has responsibility for enforcement of state groundwater standards and oversight for groundwater cleanup.

Cancer risk as a factor in setting groundwater standards and assessing groundwater contamination.  Both state and federal environmental agencies consider increased  cancer risk as a factor in assessing groundwater contamination and setting goals for groundwater cleanup.  North Carolina’s  groundwater rules list a  1:1 million increased cancer risk as a primary criteria for setting groundwater quality standards.  In 15A NCAC 2L.0202(d),  the rules require a state groundwater standard to be based on the lesser  of  the

(1)  Systemic threshold concentration calculated as follows: [Reference Dose (mg/kg/day) x 70 kg (adult body weight) x Relative Source Contribution (.10 for inorganics; .20 for organics)] / [2 liters/day (avg. water consumption)];

(2)  Concentration which corresponds to an incremental lifetime cancer risk of 1×10-6;

(3)  Taste threshold limit value;

(4)  Odor threshold limit value;

(5)  Maximum contaminant level[the federal drinking water standard]; or

(6)  National secondary drinking water standard.

Based on recent public statements by DHHS scientists, DHHS and DEQ staff in the Division of Waste Management calculated increased cancer risk associated with Cr-6 exposure using a standard protocol. The two agencies concluded that  0.07 ppb represented the break-point for the 1:1 million increased cancer risk.  The  DEQ/DHHS calculation of increased cancer risk associated with > 0.07 ppb of  Cr-6  then became the basis for  “do not drink” letters sent to well owners in 2015.

Health advisories based on groundwater contamination. DHHS has long worked with DEQ staff  to  advise well owners on health risks associated with groundwater contamination. Both DHHS and DEQ report to the Governor, creating  a strong incentive for the agencies to agree on assessment of public health risk.  Environmental and public health experts may debate  the appropriate standard for a contaminant,  but  public conflict between the two agencies is  extremely unusual and may be unprecedented.

The split between DHHS and DEQ over advice to well owners.  According to DHHS scientists, the 0.07 ppb standard for CR-6 based on increased cancer risk reflected the consensus of DHHS public health experts and staff in DEQ’s Division of Waste Management.  DEQ leaders, however, encouraged DHHS to advise well owners that water exceeding the 0.07 standard should still be considered safe to drink as long as Cr-6 levels did not exceed the federal drinking water standard of 100 ppb.  DEQ publicly raised  concerns about the DHHS health advisories  in a January 2016 presentation to a legislative committee. The presentation compared the 0.07 ppb standard  to the federal drinking water standard and to standards adopted by other states.  Within a month after the legislative presentation,  DEQ and DHHS sent new letters advising well owners that well water with Cr-6 levels below 100 ppb should be considered safe to drink because the water meets federal drinking water standards.  Recent  statements by state toxicologist Ken Rudo and state epidemiologist Megan Davies (who has resigned over the issue) make it clear that DHHS public health experts did not believe the existing state and federal standards for total chromium sufficiently protected human health and objected to the revised letters.  The 100 ppb standard for total chromium represents an increased cancer risk orders of magnitude higher than the 0.07 ppb standard — 1:700 increased risk of cancer versus  1:1 million increased risk.

Some observations:

♦   The state’s groundwater standard remains 10 ppb for total chromium and the Coal Ash Management Act of 2014 directs DEQ to use state groundwater standards in assessing drinking water wells around coal ash impoundments.  DEQ  has not  proposed a specific state groundwater standard for Cr-6 based on the DEQ/DHHS cancer risk calculation. As a result, the 0.07 ppb standard remains a health advisory rather than an enforceable groundwater standard. The federal drinking water standard of 100 ppb does not apply to either groundwater assessment or evaluation of well safety near coal ash impoundments.

♦  According to Secretary Donald van der Vaart, DEQ does not question the DHHS calculation of increased cancer risk associated with Cr-6.   Given the gap between the total chromium standard of 10 ppb and the 0.07 ppb threshold for a 1:1 million increased cancer risk associated with chromium-6,  the  total chromium standard does not meet a basic criteria for a N.C. groundwater standards — which requires a groundwater standard to be based on the 1:1 million increased cancer risk —  and should be reviewed.

♦ State and federal agencies routinely use the  1:1 million increased cancer risk as a criteria  for developing health-based standards for permitting  and to set environmental remediation goals.  Both state and federal programs also recognize that there may be a need to move off the 1:1million cancer risk criteria in individual cases because it is not technically or economically feasible to meet the standard.  In those instances, the agency can adjust a groundwater cleanup goal  (for example) to reflect the limits of available technology.

Going forward.  As a practical matter, the difference between the DHHS health-based standard and the state groundwater standard has no direct enforcement consequences for Duke Energy. For the time being, the applicable state groundwater standard continues to be the total chromium standard of 10 ppb.  Under 2016 amendments to Coal Ash Management Act,  Duke Energy must  provide a permanent alternative water supply to all well owners within 1/2 miles of a coal ash pond which makes both the  cancer risk  threshold and the state groundwater standard irrelevant to decisions about alternative water supply.

Assuming no change in the state groundwater standard, the 10 ppb total chromium standard will also drive development and approval of  groundwater remediation plans for areas surrounding the coal ash impoundments.

The cancer risk threshold for Cr-6  does raise questions about the adequacy of the state’s  total chromium standard.  The DHHS calculation of cancer risk suggests the  existing total chromium does not meet one of the basic criteria for state groundwater standards — protection against a 1:1 million increase in cancer risk.

The public conflict between DEQ and DHHS raises two other questions —

Should  state environmental and public health agencies inform citizens  of the health risk  associated with contamination that meets existing regulatory standards? DHHS public health officials felt an obligation to inform well owners of the higher cancer risk potentially associated with elevated levels of CR-6; DEQ took the position that the warnings were unnecessarily alarming if the well water met federal drinking water standards.

The other question is more technical and would inevitably come up in any reevaluation of the groundwater standard for chromium: Is there any economic or technical reason not to use the more stringent 0.07 ppb standard as the basis for assessing risk of human exposure to Cr-6 in groundwater and setting groundwater remediation goals?  The choice of a standard has implications  beyond the immediate controversy over coal ash impoundments and so far there has not been a practical critique of the 0.07 ppb threshold based on technology or cost.  The reason behind DEQ’s objection to the DHHS 0.07 ppb threshold as a basis for health advisories still isn’t entirely clear since it appears most  public water systems  in the state meet the DHHS health-based standard. Those that don’t meet the 0.07 ppb standard come much closer than a number of the wells  DEQ argued should be considered safe because the water meets the federal drinking water standard of 100 ppb.

Fact-Checking the History of Coal Ash Regulation in N.C.

July 27, 2016. Misunderstanding history makes it more likely  the same mistakes will be made again. In that spirit, a fact-check of recent DEQ statements1 about the history of coal ash regulation in North Carolina:

“In 2007, a previous administration changed landfill laws and specifically exempted coal-ash ponds from many environmental requirements.”

The statement seems to be referring to the Solid Waste Management Act of 2007 which amended landfill siting and construction standards.  Two provisions related to coal ash landfills, but nothing in the law directly addressed coal ash ponds. Coal ash was not the main focus of the 2007 law, which responded to several controversial applications to construct new landfills for household waste and construction debris. As a result, the law  focused on concerns specific to those  proposals — impacts on wildlife refuges and parks; the size and height of waste disposal areas; separation from groundwater; and guarantees the landfill owner could pay for  environmental remediation.

The first of two provisions in the 2007 law affecting coal ash allowed utilities to construct a lined coal ash landfill on top of an old coal ash disposal site under specific standards. The second provision exempted coal ash landfills on the site of a coal-fired power plant from some of the new landfill siting requirements.   Coal ash landfills located on power plant sites continued to be regulated as industrial landfills under standards that required liners;  groundwater monitoring; and setbacks from waters and wetlands. The Department of Environment of Environment and Natural Resources (“DENR”) did not request either coal ash provision.

“In 2009, the state exempted Duke Energy from having to show that its coal-ash ponds were structurally sound. If that information had been required, the corroded pipe under the Dan River coal ash pond might have been found and the spill avoided.”

In 2009, the General Assembly actually repealed a state Dam Safety Act exemption for coal ash impoundments. See Session Law 2009-390.   Before 2009,  coal ash ponds had been entirely exempt from the dam safety law.  Repeal of the exemption made coal ash impoundments subject to the dam safety law  for the first time — requiring compliance with dam safety standards; regular state inspections; and DENR review/approval of plans for expansion or repair.

DEQ’s statement may be focused on language in the 2009 legislation that allowed existing coal ash impoundments to “… be deemed to have received all of the necessary approvals  from [DENR]  and the Commission for Dam Safety for normal operation and maintenance”. In effect, the law allowed impoundments built before repeal of the exemption to continue to operate as if the state had permitted the original construction.  Those impoundments, however, would be inspected going forward and required to comply with dam safety orders to address structural deficiencies.  On balance, the 2009 legislation greatly increased rather than diminished state oversight of coal ash impoundments under the Dam Safety Act.

The Dam Safety Act amendments did not cause state and federal regulators to miss critical information about the Dan River stormwater pipe that later ruptured. Both the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and DENR dam safety staff became aware of the stormwater pipes at the Dan River impoundment in 2009-2010. Before inspecting N.C. impoundments as part of the federal response to the TVA coal ash disaster,  EPA asked electric utilities to provide information on  structural conditions at each impoundment site in the state. Maps of the Dan River site that Duke Energy provided to state and federal inspectors incorrectly identified the stormwater pipes as concrete rather than corrugated metal.   The error meant state and federal inspectors did not have complete and accurate information as background for the inspections,  but not because the 2009 law allowed electric utilities to shield information about the impoundments — it didn’t.

Note:  It later became clear that internal Duke Energy inspection reports had flagged the metal pipes at Dan River for attention as early as the 1980s. In accepting a plea deal to a large federal penalty for the Dan River spill,  Duke Energy acknowledged a pattern of neglect that included failure to take the advice of its own engineers in 2011 and 2012 to do camera inspections of the stormwater pipes.

“In 2010 federal regulators required leaks from all coal ash ponds to be evaluated. No action was taken in North Carolina for three years.” 

By 2010,  EPA  had taken several steps to get a better handle on coal ash impoundments. In 2009, EPA  launched the nationwide effort to assess the structural integrity of coal ash impoundments.   Based on information provided by the electric utilities, EPA did on-site inspections of  eight higher risk  N.C. impoundment sites in 2009-2010 including the Dan River facility.  Inspectors from the state’s water quality, waste management and dam safety programs accompanied EPA on most of those inspections.  Also in 2009-2010, state dam safety inspectors did an initial dam safety inspection of every coal ash impoundment as the first step in bringing those impoundments under the Dam Safety Act.

On a different track, EPA  provided new guidance to states on permitting  discharges  from coal ash impoundments under the Clean Water Act ; the new guidance recognized that  discharges could result from seeps and leaks through impoundment walls.  In 2010-2012, the state water quality program began increasing  groundwater monitoring requirements for coal ash ponds and  revising stormwater permits for impoundment sites. It may be that state programs gave higher priority to  structural impoundment problems, groundwater contamination and stormwater permitting in 2010-2012 and lower priority to  addressing the water quality impacts of leaks. It is difficult to know without more information.

“In 2011 the state gave Duke Energy approval to use Sutton lake, a recreational area in Wilmington, as a dumping ground for coal ash.” 

Sutton Lake has not been used for coal ash disposal. Coal ash from the Sutton Power Plant went into one of two coal ash impoundments;  outlets release water from the impoundments to Sutton Lake. Another outlet releases water from Sutton Lake to the Cape Fear River.  The earliest Clean Water Act permit for the Sutton Plant accessible on the DEQ  website (from 1996)  treated the outlet to the Cape Fear River as the permitted discharge point and applied effluent standards there. Although the permit also put water quality limits on discharges from the coal ash impoundments to Sutton Lake, the lake was regulated as a cooling pond — part of the wastewater treatment system — rather than as “waters of the State” protected under the Clean Water Act.  Every renewal of the 5-year Clean Water Act permit from 1996 through  2011 continued that approach. Apparently water quality staff revisited the question of whether Sutton Lake should be treated as a cooling pond or as “waters of the State”  in  2011, but decided to maintain the approach used in earlier permit renewals. In 2014, the department (now the Department of Environmental Quality) looked at the issue again and concluded — correctly, I think — that the permit should be modified to treat Sutton Lake as “waters of the State” and put effluent limits on discharges to the lake. It isn’t clear why the water quality program and the Environmental Management Commission reached a different conclusion in issuing and renewing earlier permits.

“For many years Duke Energy monitored the water under its ponds and found hundreds of samples that did not meet groundwater standards. Again, no action was taken. In fact, the prior administration created a policy instructing regulators not to fine Duke if the company said it would correct the problem.”

The state water quality program  first began requiring comprehensive groundwater monitoring for coal ash constituents in 2009-2010, imposing new groundwater monitoring conditions as Clean Water Act discharge permits for the impoundments came up for renewal.  The new conditions covered key contaminants associated with coal ash and required groundwater monitoring to be done under a state-approved plan to insure monitoring wells would be appropriately placed to detect violations.  Given the  time required to install monitoring wells and collect a full cycle of monitoring results, little data  showing a  groundwater standard violation related to coal ash would have been available before 2010.  None of the groundwater violations cited in DEQ’s  2014 enforcement action concerning the Sutton Power Plant predate 2009;  most come from the period between 2010 and 2014.

Before 2009-2010, most of the state’s coal ash impoundments operated without significant groundwater monitoring for decades.  Electric utilities built many of the impoundments in the 1960s and 1970s  before any environmental regulations applied.  In the late 1970s,  the state began issuing federal Clean Water Act permits for discharges from the impoundments to rivers, lakes and streams. Environmental regulation focused on the quality of water discharged from the upper layers of the ash ponds to surface waters rather than the coal ash itself.  In the 1980s-1990s, the state began putting  groundwater monitoring conditions on the discharge permits, but the monitoring focused on very basic parameters. For the Sutton Plant,  those parameters were:   water level,  pH, chlorides, iron, arsenic, selenium and total suspended solids. Groundwater concerns had not yet focused on contaminants specifically associated with coal ash.

Groundwater concerns increased after 2000 as EPA continued to lay the groundwork for a federal coal ash disposal rule. In 2006, electric utilities began voluntarily  monitoring for contaminants associated with coal ash in the face of pressure from environmental organizations and expected federal rulemaking.  Most of the data from the voluntary monitoring could not be used in state enforcement actions.  Under state groundwater rules, a violation exists only if the impoundment causes an exceedence of groundwater standards at or beyond a compliance boundary around the pond.  (For most N.C.  impoundments, the compliance boundary is set 500 feet from the edge of the pond.)  Wells used by the utilities for the voluntary groundwater monitoring had not been placed to document groundwater standard violations at the compliance boundary.  But based on the voluntary monitoring results,  the state water quality program  put broader groundwater monitoring conditions on impoundment permits and required monitoring to be done under a state-approved well-siting plan to insure the data could be used for future enforcement.

The enforcement policy mentioned in the DEQ statement refers to 2010 groundwater enforcement guidance developed by water quality staff.  Since the expanded groundwater monitoring requirements applied to facilities that had operated for many years without monitoring, the water quality program developed a policy that put the enforcement emphasis on remediation of contamination rather than assessment of penalties for activities that had been unregulated  or lightly regulated for much of the facility’s history.

What the fact-checked history suggests:

It is difficult to contain environmental impacts 20 to 40 years after the fact. Both state and federal regulators struggled to understand and address problems associated with a method of coal ash disposal electric utilities had already invested in and become reliant on by the time environmental impacts became a concern.

The basic arc of state and federal regulation looks like this: In the 1970s,  state and federal regulators focused on discharges from existing coal ash ponds to surface waters. There was a quiet period between issuance of the first Clean Water Act discharge permits for coal ash impoundments in the late 1970s through the 1990s.  Regulators assumed the electric utilities were maintaining the impoundments properly and indicators of  groundwater contamination associated with coal ash had not reached critical mass. EPA began working on a federal coal ash disposal rule in the late 1990s, but abandoned the proposed rule in 2000 in the face of strong political opposition. Between 2000 and 2008, troubling data on groundwater and surface water pollution associated with coal ash ponds accumulated and the 2008 TVA spill undermined confidence in the electric utilities’ maintenance of impoundments.  Both state and federal regulatory efforts accelerated in 2008-2009, leading to state permitting changes and renewed efforts to adopt a federal coal ash disposal rule. (EPA finalized the federal rule in 2015.)

The issues surrounding coal ash have not been the responsibility of any one administration or a single branch of government. The history spans multiple governors of both political parties and legislative as well as executive action.  Coal ash provisions in the 2007 Solid Waste Management Act came out of direct negotiation between the electric utilities and legislators.  In  2009, the General Assembly repealed the Dam Safety Act exemption for coal ash impoundments,  but did not move a bill to set comprehensive state standards for coal ash disposal out of committee.

Leaps in state law on coal ash  management followed specific crises — the coal ash impoundment exemption from the Dam Safety Act survived until the 2008 TVA spill put a spotlight on poor maintenance. In  2009, the  General Assembly had no interest in moving comprehensive coal ash disposal legislation; that only changed after the 2014 Dan River coal ash spill .

By 2009, accumulating evidence of groundwater contamination and other water quality concerns led the state water quality program to use existing permitting authority to require more groundwater monitoring around coal ash impoundments and increase stormwater requirements. Those  efforts to use existing permitting tools more effectively laid the foundation for later groundwater enforcement actions.

 

 1 The statements  in bold appeared in  a recent letter by DEQ Assistant Secretary Tom Reeder to the Raleigh News and Observer.

Coal Ash, Contaminated Wells and Providing a Safe Drinking Water Supply

May 31, 2016. The previous post  discussed legislative efforts to resolve the separation of powers conflict still hovering over implementation of the 2014 Coal Ash Management Act. The same piece of legislation, Senate Bill 71,  also attempts to fix other problems that have developed around coal ash cleanup efforts. One of the most significant changes in Senate Bill 71 responds to concerns about contaminated drinking water wells near coal ash ponds.  The final version of Senate Bill 71 approved today by both the House and Senate gives more well owners the certainty of an alternative water supply.  A comparison of Senate Bill 71 to the original Coal Ash Management Act below.

2014 Coal Ash Management Act:

♦ Guaranteed an alternative water supply only to well owners located within 1/2 mile and down-gradient of the coal ash impoundment.  Well testing and groundwater assessment done around the impoundments since 2014  have detected high levels of one or more contaminants associated with coal ash, including hexavalent chromium, in wells located up-gradient or side-gradient of the impoundments. Although groundwater usually follows surface topography, the  underlying geology and human activity can alter the direction of  flow. The alternative water supply provision in the Coal Ash Management Act did not apply to those wells.

♦   The requirement for Duke Energy to provide an alternative water supply was contingent on well sampling showing a contaminant associated with coal ash above the level allowed under state groundwater standards.  The  lack  of a state groundwater standard for some contaminants  (including venadium and hexavalent chromium) led to confusion, conflicting advice to well owners,  and lack of clarity on the standard DEQ would use to require Duke Energy to provide an alternative water source.  For background on the controversy over the groundwater standards see an earlier post here . Many well owners have received bottled water for months because of documented well contamination, but remain uncertain whether DEQ will require Duke Energy to provide a permanent alternative water supply.

♦  The provision on alternate water supply enacted in 2014, G.S. 130A-309.209(c), did not specifically require a permanent solution — such as connection to a public water system — rather than bottled water.

♦ Under the 2014 law, owners of contaminated wells located up-gradient and side-gradient of a coal ash impoundment might receive alternate supplies under the state’s groundwater corrective action rules,.  The rules (referenced in the 2014 Coal Ash Management Act) apply to all groundwater contamination incidents and require a company responsible for groundwater contamination to address health risks created by the contamination.  The  corrective action rules,  however, only apply to a person/company shown to be 1. responsible for contamination that 2. exceeds state groundwater standards. Two years after enactment of the Coal Ash Management Act,  controversy surrounds the standards for some contaminants and groundwater studies have not yet been sufficient to determine whether the coal ash ponds  caused contamination found  in up-gradient and side-gradient wells.

Senate Bill 71:

♦ Requires Duke Energy to provide an alternative water supply to the owner of every well located within 1/2 mile of the compliance boundary surrounding a coal ash pond. (The compliance boundary — either 250 feet or 500 feet from the edge of the impoundment depending on its age — is the point at which exceedance of a state  groundwater standard would be a violation.)

♦  For wells within 1/2 mile of the compliance boundary around an ash pond, alternative water supply would be required without regard to the location of the well in relation to the impoundment (down-gradient, up-gradient or side-gradient) or demonstration of a groundwater standard violation.

♦ The bill also requires Duke Energy to provide alternative water supply to well owners located outside the 1/2 mile perimeter, but located in an area at risk  of contamination because of the projected migration of groundwater contamination.

♦ The bill expressly requires Duke Energy to provide a permanent alternative water supply source and creates a preference for connection to a public water system.  The bill allows  installation of a filtration system instead if extension of a water line would be cost-prohibitive. The State Water Infrastructure Authority would review Duke Energy’s alternative water supply plan for each impoundment site and make the final decision on the type of permanent water supply.

Several things are notable about the Senate Bill 71 approach.   First, the bill  provides  certainty to well owners  that would not have been possible as clearly or as quickly any other way.  But the bill is also a reminder that property owners affected by groundwater contamination from other sources have a longer, more difficult and less certain road to a safe drinking water supply.

A Proposal: Insure owners of wells near coal ash sites aren’t exposed to greater health risks as a result

April 18, 2016. An earlier post discussed the confusion over “do not drink” advisories issued — and later withdrawn —  for  a number of wells near coal ash sites.  There continues to be confusion among legislators, state agencies and the public about the correct response to high levels of hexavalent chromium (Cr-6) and vanadium in drinking water wells near coal ash impoundments. This post attempts to  clarify some misconceptions and offers a proposal.

First, a clarification about individual contaminant standards.  Some legislators understood presentations by the  Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) and the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)  to mean that there are multiple, inconsistent standards for a contaminant. In fact,  the state uses one standard for each contaminant to determine health risk and require groundwater remediation. But as the earlier post explained, the standard may come from Safe Drinking Water Act standards  or state groundwater rules.  Drinking water standards address a narrow set of contaminants  likely to be found in public water systems; groundwater standards  cover a broader range of extremely hazardous substances that may become a health threat because of a specific pollution incident.

State groundwater rules list health-based concentration limits for many hazardous substances, but also recognize that a pollution incident may involve a contaminant that does not yet have a groundwater standard.  For those contaminants, the rules set the default standard at “non-detect” —  any detectable concentration of the contaminant would be a violation. But the rules also create a process for setting  an interim groundwater standard that would allow concentrations above detection levels based on an evaluation of health risk.  DHHS used that process  to develop the interim standards for vanadium and hexavalent chromium (CR-6) that  led to  “do not drink” advisories for  a number of wells near coal ash facilities.

Gaps in the changing state response.  DEQ and DHHS offered a two-part explanation for withdrawal of the “do not drink” letters. The two points and some additional context for each:

  1. Levels of vanadium and Cr-6 in the wells do not violate state or federal drinking water rules.  Since there is no drinking water standard for either vanadium or Cr-6, this is true as far as it goes.  But the lack of a drinking water standard does not imply safety.  State and federal agencies have never relied solely on drinking water standards to make decisions about mitigation of health risks at contaminated sites  because drinking water standards do not cover many extremely hazardous substances.  That is why the process for asking DHHS to set interim state groundwater standards  exists. The question should be whether concentrations of vanadium and Cr-6  in the wells represent a significant additional health risk that can be minimized by either providing an alternative water source or remediating the groundwater.
  2. A number of large N.C. public water systems also do not meet the DHHS interim standards for vanadium and Cr-6.  The implication has been that the well water is as safe as water supplied to customers of public water systems.  In recent weeks, media and public interest organizations have looked more closely at the levels of vanadium and Cr-6 in public water systems as compared to the wells near coal ash facilities.   Although some N.C. water systems exceed the DHHS interim standards for vanadium or hexavalent chromium, most  water systems appear to meet the DHHS standards. A WRAL news story includes a chart showing both maximum and average concentrations of Cr-6 in public water systems across the state here.  DHHS set the interim standard for Cr-6 at 0.07 parts per billion, representing a 1:1 million cancer risk over a lifetime. WRAL’s analysis found that only about one-third of N.C.’s public water systems have average concentrations of Cr-6 exceeding 0.07 ppb.  More importantly, those public water systems come much closer to meeting the  DHHS standard than a number of the tested wells. The public water systems with the highest average concentrations of Cr-6 had concentrations less than half that of some wells tested near Buck Steam Station.

A proposal:  Issuance of health advisories and steps to provide alternative water supply to well owners should be based on comparative health risk.

The discussion of health advisories issued to well owners around coal ash sites has become focused on whether  public water systems meet the DHHS recommended standards for vanadium and Cr-6.  That is the wrong question. Many (most) North Carolina water systems meet the DHHS standards;  those that do not still provide water that is safer than water in a number of the tested wells. Environmental remediation programs exist in part to reduce  health risks created by a pollution incident.  To the extent well owners will be exposed to greater health risk as a result of groundwater contamination, the additional risk should be eliminated or minimized to the extent possible.  The question is not whether all public water systems meet the DHHS standards. The question is whether groundwater pollution has exposed these well owners to greater health risk — and one way to answer that question is to compare contaminant levels in the well water to the nearest public water system. If the public water system provides water with lower contaminant concentrations that translate into lower additional cancer risk and less risk of acute toxicity, the well owner should be provided with advice on the higher risk of drinking the well water.  And any person responsible for the contamination should be required to provide an alternative water source.

To Drink or Not to Drink: A Change in Advice for Well Owners


March 17, 2016. In 2015,  the N.C. Division of Public Health (Department of Health and Human Services) sent letters advising the owners of  369  wells located near coal ash ponds not to drink their well water because of elevated levels of vanadium and chromium-6.  Last week, the Division of Public Health sent letters to those same well owners to withdraw the “do not drink” advisory.  Some questions and answers on the conflicting advice below.

What are vanadium and chromium-6 (Cr-6)? Both elements occur naturally in the environment and can be found in coal ash. Both may  be concentrated in the air or in groundwater as a result of industrial activities.  Inhalation of Cr-6 (or hexavalent chromium) has been associated with increased risk of lung cancer. In 2010,  the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency  began a new health study to determine whether ingestion of  Cr-6  in drinking water increases other types of cancer risk. The Erin Brokovitch story of hexavalent chromium contamination in the town of Hinkley, California raised public awareness of Cr-6 as a public health issue. In Hinkley, Pacific Gas & Electric  had used Cr-6 as an additive in cooling water for a natural gas compression station. The  Cr-6 percolated into groundwater from unlined ponds used to store the cooling water, contaminating the town’s drinking water supply. (Levels of Cr-6 in  Hinkley’s groundwater were exponentially higher than concentrations found  in North Carolina  wells.)

Are there drinking water standards for vanadium and  Cr-6? There is no federal drinking water standard for vanadium.   The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has adopted a drinking water standard for total chromium of 100 parts per billion (ppb);  the standard covers combined concentrations of chromium-3 (a nutritional element found in plant material) and chromium-6.  Water systems required to meet federal Safe Drinking Water Act standards monitor  total chromium levels, but not necessarily  Cr-6. Nationally, only the State of California  has adopted a specific drinking water standard for Cr-6. In 2014, after  years of  study prompted by the Hinkley contamination,  California adopted a standard of 10 parts per billion for Cr-6 in drinking water — 1/10th the concentration allowed under the federal drinking water standard for total chromium.

How are  N.C. groundwater standards different from  federal drinking water standards?  In part,  the two sets of standards serve different purposes. Drinking water standards adopted by U.S. EPA under the Safe Drinking Water Act only apply to the treated water that public water systems  provide to their customers.  Under the law, “public water system” means any system providing water to 15 or  more connections or to 25 or more people whether the system is  operated by a local government or a for-profit water utility.  Federal drinking water standards do not apply to privately owned water supply wells serving individual homes or businesses.

N.C.’s  groundwater standards are used to identify unsafe levels of groundwater contamination;  set goals for groundwater remediation; and advise well owners on use of water from affected wells.  Most N.C. groundwater standards track the federal drinking water standard for the same contaminant, but in a few cases the state has adopted a more stringent groundwater standard or has adopted a groundwater standard for a contaminant that has no corresponding drinking water standard.  Leading up to the well testing around coal ash ponds, N.C. had no groundwater standard for vanadium and no specific standard for Cr-6. although the state had a groundwater standard of 10 ppb for total chromium (more stringent that the 100 ppb drinking water standard for total chromium.)

How does N.C. set groundwater standards?  The N.C. Environmental Management Commission has adopted state groundwater standards as rules. Since existing groundwater standards may not address every potential contaminant,  the rules also create a process for developing  a temporary  standard  — an Interim Maximum Allowable Concentration or “IMAC” —  to address an unregulated contaminant.  Epidemiologists in the N.C. Division of Public Health generally develop a recommended IMAC based on review of human health effects such as toxicity and increased cancer risk.

Why did the  Division of Public Health send “do not drink” letters in 2015 based on  vanadium and chromium-6?   Since no state groundwater standard or federal drinking water standards existed for vanadium and  Cr-6, DEQ  asked the Division of Public Health to develop interim groundwater standards (the IMACs described above)  to be used in assessing wells around the coal ash ponds. Division of Public Health calculated a standard of 0.07 ppb for Cr-6 and 0.3 ppb for vanadium.  In each case, the deciding factor was the concentration associated with an  incremental increase in cancer risk. The table below shows the IMAC standard compared to the federal Safe Drinking Water Act standard and the N.C. groundwater standard.

Contaminant Fed. Drinking Water Standard N.C. Groundwater Standard IMAC
Vandadium No standard No standard 0.3 ppb
C.hromium-6 None –Total Cr 100 ppb None – Total Cr 10 ppb 0.07 ppb

Why did Division of Public Health withdraw the “do not drink” letters?  None of the  well owners who received “do not drink” letters  based solely on the vanadium and Cr-6 IMAC standards have well water that would violate Safe Drinking Water Act standards for a public water system.  DEQ has reported that 70% of public water systems in the U.S. exceed the IMAC standards set by Division of Public Health, including several large public water systems in North Carolina. (The information, provided in a report to the legislature’s Environmental Review Commission,  did not indicate how many of those systems exceeded the IMAC standard for vanadium versus Cr-6. You can find the entire DEQ presentation to the Commission  here.)

The gap between the IMAC standards and Safe Drinking Water Act standards meant that well  owners were being advised not to drink water that meets current drinking water standards and could lawfully be provided to customers of a  public water system.   As a practical matter, that also  means the well owners may not have access to an alternative water supply of any better quality  since  the nearest public water system also may not meet the IMAC standards.

None of this  means the analysis done by the Division of Public Health in developing the IMACs was wrong. Environmental and public health standards change with additional knowledge; the fact that the U.S. Environmental Protection has undertaken a new health study of Cr-6 in particular suggests some question about the adequacy of the  federal drinking water standard based solely on total chromium.  The standards adopted by EPA and the states also sometimes involve compromise between the most protective health-based standard and the practicalities (and cost) of meeting that standard.

Making Sense of a Coal Ash Penalty

March 8, 2016.   The  civil penalty for  groundwater violations around Duke Energy’s Sutton Plant in New Hanover County has taken several unprecedented  twists and turns.  This post looks at the  $25 million civil penalty for groundwater contamination at the Sutton Plant that became a $7 million civil penalty for groundwater violations at all 14 coal ash sites in the state and then a $7 million civil penalty just for the Sutton violations.

Groundwater Enforcement 101.   The Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) can order remediation of groundwater contamination and assess civil penalties for violation of the state’s  health-based groundwater standards.  Some contaminants (like arsenic) occur naturally; if natural  “background” levels of the contaminant exceed the state standard, the background level becomes the standard. State rules allow for some exceedence of  groundwater standards within the footprint of a waste disposal facility, but set a “compliance boundary” around the facility where the  standards must be met.  Coal ash ponds permitted before 1983 must meet groundwater standards within 500 feet of the ash pond; those  permitted later have a  250-foot compliance boundary.

To assess a civil penalty for coal ash contamination,  DEQ  must show: 1. Contaminants in the groundwater exceed the state standard (which may require determining background levels if the contaminant occurs naturally); 2. Exceedences occur at or beyond the compliance boundary; and 3. Coal ash  caused or contributed to the contamination. State law caps the maximum penalty for a single groundwater violation  at  $25,000.  In setting the specific penalty amount within the cap, DEQ considers a number of penalty factors including the extent of environmental harm;  whether the violation was intentional; and any compliance costs the violator may have avoided.  Since  DEQ can assess daily penalties for continuing violations, the total civil penalty may exceed $25,000  if a violation continues over a period of time.

Now a Little Coal Ash History. The state originally permitted  coal ash ponds as wastewater treatment systems. The ponds receive, treat and discharge  process wastewater and sometimes stormwater.  A coal ash pond functions like  the  settling basins used  in other wastewater treatment systems; the coal ash settles out of the  wastewater slurry,  reducing pollutants in the top layer of pond water.  The utility then discharges wastewater  from the top of the pond to a river, stream or lake under a  Clean Water Act Permit —  the  National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (or “NPDES”)  permit.  NPDES permits  protect surface water from pollution; since groundwater was never the focus, the  permits  historically required very limited groundwater monitoring around coal ash ponds.

In response to pressure for national coal ash disposal standards,  companies operating coal-fired power plants began a program of voluntary groundwater monitoring in 2006 and provided results to the state.   (As a voluntary program, the power companies alone decided what contaminants to monitor for and where to put monitoring wells.) By  2009,  state water quality officials had become so concerned about the utilities’ groundwater data  that the Division of Water Quality  (DWQ) moved  to put stronger  groundwater monitoring conditions on NPDES permits for coal ash ponds as the permits came up for renewal.  The new permit conditions made monitoring for specific contaminants mandatory and required  DWQ approval of the monitoring plan so monitoring wells would be appropriately placed to identify violations at the compliance boundary.

As DWQ began adding monitoring conditions to permits,  the senior manager in DWQ’s groundwater protection program issued a  memo  explaining how the program would take enforcement actions based on the new groundwater monitoring data. The memo applied to any facility that had operated for a long period of time before being required to do groundwater monitoring.  It  implicitly recognizes that imposing groundwater monitoring conditions  after many years of facility operation may result in immediate detection of groundwater exceedences — giving the operator little opportunity to prevent  a violation. The memo did not completely foreclose  the possibility of a civil penalty for groundwater violations at these facilities, but indicated that  DWQ  may not issue a Notice of Violation (the first step to a penalty) as long as the operator responded to state requests for assessment and clean up of any contamination.

The Sutton Plant Civil Penalty. The Sutton Plant’s wastewater system, consisting of two coal ash ponds built in 1971 and 1984, has had an NPDES  permit since 1977.    For most  of the system’s history,  the  permit only required monitoring for a  limited number of  groundwater quality parameters —  groundwater level, pH, Arsenic, Iron, Total Dissolved Solids, Chlorides and Selenium.   When DWQ renewed the Sutton Plant’s NPDES permit in 2011,  the new permit required monitoring of  additional contaminants (including boron, thallium, and manganese) under a state-approved monitoring plan designed to detect exceedences at the compliance boundary.  In March 2015,  DEQ assessed a record $25 million civil penalty for groundwater violations around the Sutton Plant. The civil penalty  covered a number of different groundwater standard violations over varying periods of time. The earliest violations identified in the assessment  document  dated back to 2009 (for boron) and 2010 (for thallium).    Most of the violations  (for iron, arsenic, selenium, manganese and total dissolved solids)  dated from 2012 or 2013. To reach the  $25 million assessment, DEQ  assessed either $1,000 or $5,000  per day (from initial detection to the assessment date) for each contaminant that exceeded state groundwater standards.

A Big — and Short-Lived — Settlement. Duke Energy  appealed the penalty and several months later  DEQ agreed to a settlement reducing the civil penalty to $7 million.  The most notable thing about the September 2015 settlement agreement was not the penalty reduction, but the fact that the settlement would have resolved all groundwater violations (known or discovered in the future) around all 14 Duke Energy coal ash impoundment sites in the state.  Southern Environmental Law Center (SELC),  on behalf of several environmental organizations, challenged the settlement agreement in court. SELC’s appeal did not contest  the penalty reduction for the Sutton violations, but argued  Administrative Law Judge Phil Berger, Jr. had no authority to approve a settlement agreement affecting issues beyond the Sutton civil penalty.  SELC particularly complained that the settlement agreement affected other coal ash enforcement cases without notice to the parties in those cases — including organizations represented by SELC.  Those enforcement cases dealt with specific actions required of Duke Energy to  address groundwater contamination around coal ash ponds at multiple sites.

Key provisions in the September 2015  DEQ-Duke Energy   settlement agreement

♦ Duke Energy agreed to pay a civil penalty  of $7 million and accelerate groundwater remediation at the Sutton, Asheville, Belews Creek and H.F. Lee plants. The settlement agreement did not set a timeline for the accelerated remediation.

♦ DEQ agreed to dismiss groundwater enforcement cases already pending in superior court related to the Sutton Plant and the Asheville Steam Station. See the SELC appeal of the settlement agreement for more on the relationship between the settlement agreement and pending enforcement cases.

♦ DEQ agreed not to issue Notices of Violation,  notices requiring assessment or remediation, civil penalty assessments or to  take any other enforcement actions against Duke Energy based on groundwater conditions “at any of the Duke Energy Sites” as long as Duke Energy complied  with requirements of the Coal Ash Management Act related to groundwater assessment, remediation and closure of the coal ash basins. Under the agreement, the “Duke Energy Sites” included all 14 coal ash sites across the state.

♦ DEQ agreed not to change groundwater monitoring conditions in existing or future NPDES permits for the coal ash ponds unless required by  court order;  a federal or state law; a rule; or in response to an immediate threat to public health.  Under the agreement, an “immediate threat to public health” had to involve something more than violation of a  health-based groundwater standard.  In effect, the settlement prevented DEQ from using its permitting authority to requiring monitoring for additional contaminants.

♦ DEQ agreed not to use groundwater monitoring data collected under either the NPDES permit conditions or under provisions in the Coal Ash Management Act for any purpose other than classification and closure of the coal ash ponds. In other words, DEQ agreed not to use groundwater monitoring data for enforcement purposes.

Reversing Direction.  In February, Superior Court Judge Paul Ridgeway held a hearing  on SELC’s objections to the Sutton settlement agreement.  Persuaded that the settlement agreement  affected the other enforcement  cases already before him,  Judge Ridgeway indicated an intent to take jurisdiction over the settlement agreement unless Judge Berger  narrowed the scope of his order in the Sutton civil penalty case.   Charlotte Business Journal has  reported  that Judge Berger later issued a revised order at the request of DEQ and Duke Energy.   According to the article, the settlement agreement between Duke Energy and DEQ did not change, but the  order  approving the settlement has been expressly limited to the Sutton civil penalty case.  (I have not been able to find the  revised order  on either the Office of Administrative Hearings  or DEQ website.)  As a result, the $7 million civil penalty now covers only  groundwater violations at the Sutton Plant.

Signs and Portents? DEQ made several unusual decisions in assessing and then settling the Sutton civil penalty case:

The  original $25 million civil penalty for the Sutton groundwater violations broke from past enforcement practices.  State programs  rarely impose daily penalties for newly discovered groundwater violations. Daily penalties are usually reserved for willful, intentional violations and for violators who  fail to quickly address contamination once it has been detected.  DEQ didn’t cite either of those aggravating factors in assessing the original $25 million Sutton penalty.  To reach the $25 million total, DEQ assessed a penalty of either $1,000 or $5,000 a day (depending on the contaminant) from the date of detection to the date of assessment.  (The contamination persists today and will until coal ash on the site has been removed, which everyone understands will require more time.)  The question is whether DEQ’s very aggressive penalty for the Sutton violations indicates a change in enforcement policy that may affect  other groundwater cases.

There doesn’t seem to be any precedent for DEQ agreeing –as it did in the original Sutton settlement — to limit its own permitting and enforcement authority to settle a civil penalty case.  State agencies often settle  civil penalty cases for a lower penalty amount. In the Sutton settlement, DEQ  also agreed not to change groundwater monitoring conditions on Duke Energy’s NPDES permits except in very narrow circumstances. Most of those circumstances required  some outside force  — federal law, a court order — to compel the change. In effect, DEQ  gave up the ability to use its permitting authority to  require monitoring for additional contaminants. The department also agreed not to issue Notices of Regulatory Requirements (orders for assessment and remediation of contamination)  or take  new enforcement actions against Duke Energy based on coal ash contamination at the 14 sites in N.C. The settlement agreement was conditioned on Duke Energy complying with provisions in the Coal Ash Management Act on  groundwater assessment and corrective action, but those requirements assume application of state groundwater regulations. It isn’t clear why DEQ would agree to give up use of normal groundwater enforcement tools like the Notice of Regulatory Requirements. Limits on DEQ use of groundwater data for enforcement purposes could have affected the state’s ability to address  groundwater problems discovered later.

What Does it Mean?  Assuming Judge Berger’s revised order has set much of the Sutton settlement agreement aside, the Sutton case is mostly  interesting as an insight into DEQ’s enforcement decision-making. It is hard to identify a consistent principle that would explain both  DEQ’s very aggressive use of civil penalty power in the first instance and DEQ’s willingness to  give up significant permitting and enforcement authority  to settle the  case. The question is whether the Sutton decisions  were peculiar to it or have broader implications.