Tag Archives: Mining and Energy Commission

Risk-Ranking Coal Ash Impoundments

February 12, 2016.  The 2014 Coal Ash Management Act, Session Law 2014-122 , required the Department of Environmental Quality (then the Department of Environment and Natural Resources) to propose classifications for  coal ash impoundments in the state as High, Intermediate or Low Risk. The risk classification determines both how quickly the impoundment must be closed and whether closure requires removal of the coal ash for beneficial reuse or disposal in a lined landfill. Only Low Risk impoundments can be closed by de-watering and capping the coal ash in place.  The General Assembly designated Dan River Steam Station, Riverbend, Asheville and the Sutton Plant as high risk by law;  DEQ and the Coal Ash Management Commission have responsibility for classifying the remaining 10 coal ash sites.

Statutory Criteria for Risk Classification. The law, in G.S. 130A-309.211,  listed factors to be considered in classifying the impoundments:

(1)        Any hazards to public health, safety, or welfare resulting from the impoundment.
(2)        The structural condition and hazard potential of the impoundment.
(3)        The proximity of surface waters to the impoundment and whether any surface waters are contaminated or threatened by contamination as a result of the impoundment.
(4)        Information concerning the horizontal and vertical extent of soil and groundwater contamination for all contaminants confirmed to be present in groundwater in exceedance of groundwater quality standards and all significant factors affecting contaminant transport.
(5)        The location and nature of all receptors and significant exposure pathways.
(6)        The geological and hydrogeological features influencing the movement and chemical and physical character of the contaminants.
(7)        The amount and characteristics of coal combustion residuals in the impoundment.
(8)        Whether the impoundment is located within an area subject to a 100‑year flood.
(9)        Any other factor the Department deems relevant to establishment of risk.

DEQ’s Proposed Risk Classifications. On January 29, 2016,  DEQ  released a report providing information to support proposed classifications for most coal ash impoundments.  (Several impoundments have temporary classifications pending complete information on impacts to water supply wells.)  DEQ has based its risk classifications on three “key factors” — one each for groundwater, surface water and dam safety risks:

♦ Groundwater Risk Factor: The number of people served by water supply wells within 1500 feet and down-gradient of the impoundment’s compliance boundary that are potentially or known to be exposed to groundwater contamination related to the impoundment. DEQ used a scale based on the number of people affected by well contamination:  0 people = Low Risk; 11-20 people = Intermediate Risk and  >  30 people = High Risk.  Transitional  classifications of Low/Intermediate Risk and Intermediate/High Risk cover the gaps between the three basic categories.

♦ Surface Water Risk Factor:   The impoundment’s location relative to the 100-year floodplain.   Impoundments located outside of the 100-year floodplain or contained by a stream valley embankment with an engineered discharge (such as a spillway) have been classified as Low Risk. Impoundments sited along the run of a river, in the floodplain, and within the 100-year flood level are classified as  High Risk.

♦ Dam Safety:  Structural integrity and maintenance as reflected in dam safety inspections.    Impoundments that received a Notice of Deficiency  identifying non-structural deficiencies at the last dam safety inspection have been classified as Intermediate Risk.  Impoundments that received a Notice of Deficiency identifying structural deficiencies  at the last inspection have been classified as High Risk. One important note —  a number of impoundments have a High Risk dam safety rating because of structural deficiencies identified in the last inspection, but DEQ has discounted that factor in the overall facility risk rating by assuming  the impoundments will be Low Risk once the structural deficiencies has been corrected.

Other Risk Factors.  The DEQ  report describes a number of  “other considerations”  that were not given the same weight in risk classification as the key factors. “Other considerations”  for groundwater and surface water risk include significant site conditions such as:  toxicity of contaminants exceeding groundwater standards; the extent of groundwater contamination; proximity of coal ash to the water table; potential impact of groundwater contamination on surface waters; location of the impoundment in a stream or drainage way; the water quality classification and use of  nearby surface waters; and proximity to a drinking water intake.

How DEQ Arrived at Each Proposed Classification.  The exact method DEQ used to arrived at the overall classification for each site is something of a mystery.   We know the three “key factors” largely drove the classification because the report tells us that. But there is no explanation of how (or whether) DEQ also used the information on “other considerations”  or even how the three key factors were weighted.

Example: Buck Steam Station.  Looking in greater depth at the classification of  one coal ash facility  provides a little more insight into DEQ’s classification decisions. DEQ has  temporarily  given Buck Steam Station a Low-Intermediate classification until the department receives additional information on impacts to water supply wells. If no well users near Buck Steam Station are  affected  by contamination associated with the impoundments (or well users have an alternate water source),  DEQ intends to classify the Buck  impoundments as Low Risk. Well impacts will be the deciding factor in the proposed classification. Buck rated as Low Risk under the key factor for surface water impacts because the impoundments are outside the 100-year flood plain. The three impoundments at Buck rated as  High Risk for dam safety, but DEQ assumed the  impoundments would  be Low Risk once the deficiencies have been corrected.

Looking  beyond the three key factors,  however, Buck rated as  high risk on a number of other groundwater and surface water parameters including:   contaminants exceeding state groundwater standards at or beyond the compliance boundary;  proximity of coal ash to the water table;  and discharge of contaminated groundwater to surface waters. It rated Intermediate risk based on the use of adjacent surface waters (the Yadkin River has been classified for water supply) and proximity to a drinking water intake. On some other parameters related to surface water, Buck Steam Station rated as low or intermediate risk.  See pages 92-99  for the entire list of risk ratings for the Buck impoundments.

The Buck classification seems to be fairly representative. Overall,  the  “other considerations”  discussed at great length in the report are  irrelevant to DEQ’s proposed classifications.  The one exception has to do with groundwater; after focusing the “key factor” for groundwater on impacts to down-gradient water supply wells, DEQ has deferred classification of several sites to get additional information on up-gradient and side-gradient wells.   It is also unclear how DEQ weighted different risk levels for the three key factors to arrive at an overall classification.   The Cape Fear Steam Station  was ranked Low Risk for groundwater (no impacted wells); High Risk for surface water (all of the impoundments are in the 100-year floodplain); and High Risk for  half of those impoundments because of dam safety deficiencies. But the facility as a whole received a classification of Intermediate Risk.

There may be more method to the  proposed classifications than it appears. It is possible that DEQ weighted the key factors and “other considerations”  or viewed some conditions as mitigating others.  Since the report does not provide any explanation, it is difficult to know.  The Coal Ash Management Act itself did not provide any guidance on how to translate nine statutory criteria into three risk classifications. Normally, that gap would be filled through rulemaking.   In the absence of  rules (or even a clear explanation in the DEQ report), it is hard to identify  the principles underlying the classification decisions.  The approach to groundwater risk classification may be particularly controversial since an impoundment that contains a very large volume of coal ash; extends below the water table; has documented groundwater standard violations at or beyond the compliance boundary; and discharges contaminated groundwater to surface water could be classified as Low Risk as long as no existing water supply wells users are affected.

Next Steps.  DEQ has scheduled public meetings on the proposed classifications as required under the law.  Those meetings will take place in March.  The final decisions on classification will be made by the Coal Ash Management Commission.  (Assuming the Commission can be reconstituted in time; see an earlier post on the Commission’s inability to act because  appointments to the Commission violated the N.C. Constitution.)

Appointments to Environment/Energy Commissions Violated N.C. Constitution

February 1, 2016. On January 29, 2016, the N.C. Supreme Court issued a decision in McCrory v. Berger — a lawsuit filed  by Governor Pat McCrory  to challenge the constitutionality of two recent state laws that created new executive branch commissions dominated by legislative appointees. The ruling in the Governor’s favor means the three commissions cannot act until the General Assembly changes the statutes governing commission appointments.

Background. The lawsuit concerned appointments to the Coal Ash Management Commission,  the Oil and Gas Commission,  and the Mining Commission. The Coal Ash Management Act of 2014  gave the Coal Ash Management Commission authority to (among other things) make final decisions on closure of coal ash impoundments.  The 2014 Energy Modernization Act eliminated the  Mining and Energy Commission (created in 2012) and divided its regulatory responsibilities  between a new Oil and Gas Commission and a reconstituted Mining Commission. In each case, the legislature gave itself the power to appoint a majority of the commission members.

The lawsuit filed by Gov. McCrory argued the legislative appointments violated the N.C. Constitution. In March of 2015, a special panel of three superior court judges ruled in the Governor’s favor, concluding that the N.C. Constitution bars legislative appointments to commissions that have executive authority. “Executive authority” generally means authority to implement existing laws as distinct from legislative authority to adopt new laws.   See an earlier post  on the superior court decision.

N.C. Supreme Court opinion. The N.C. Supreme Court opinion disagrees with the superior court decision on one key point — the Supreme Court ruled that the N.C. Constitution does not entirely bar the legislature from making appointments to executive branch commissions.  The court interpreted the Constitution’s “appointments clause” to allow the legislature to make appointments to statutorily-created offices including commission seats. The court ruled, however, that  legislative appointments to the Coal Ash Management Commission,  Oil and Gas Commission  and Mining Commission violated the separation of powers clause in Art. I, § 6 of the N.C. Constitution,  which requires that  “[t]he legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of the State government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other.”

The court concluded that the appointments scheme for the three executive branch  commissions interfered with the Governor’s constitutional duty to insure that state laws are faithfully executed:

In light of the final executive authority that these three commissions possess, the Governor must have enough control over them to perform his constitutional duty. The degree of control that the Governor has over the three commissions depends on his ability to appoint the commissioners, to supervise their day-to-day activities, and to remove them from office.

The court pointed to three factors that combined to create an unconstitutional legislative  interference with the Governor’s executive powers and responsibilities:

1. Each commission has authority to take final executive action  (i.e., the Coal Ash Management Commission has the final authority to prioritize coal ash ponds for closure and approve final closure plans);

2. The legislature appointed a majority of the members to each commission; and

3. The legislature limited the Governor’s ability to remove commission members by allowing removal only for cause (such as misconduct).

The implication of the decision is that a separation of powers violation has occurred when all three conditions exist.  The court included a footnote specifically suggesting that the outcome may be different with respect to a body like the Rules Review Commission that exercises a different kind of authority.

The court refused to address another separation of powers issue raised in the case. The Governor  argued that the legislature also violated separation of powers  by statutorily directing the Coal Ash Management Commission (CAMC)  to operate “independently” of the executive department where it is housed.  (Legislation creating the CAMC placed the commission under the Department of Public Safety.) The Supreme Court held the issue had been mooted by the portion of its decision ruling appointments to the CAMC unconstitutional.  The issue could come up again if the  legislature changes the appointments statute in response to the court’s decision,  but leaves the “independence” provision  in place.

Implications.  The three commissions directly named in the case cannot act until the legislature changes the unconstitutional appointment provisions and new appointments are made.  The Coal Ash Management Commission (CAMC) began meeting in 2014, but has not met since the March 2015 superior court decision that first ruled appointments to the CAMC unconstitutional. In the meantime, other pieces of the Coal Ash Management Act have moved  forward; a newly appointed CAMC will need to catch up.  The Oil and Gas Commission took over implementation of state laws on oil and gas development from the Mining and Energy Commission, so the court’s ruling could delay decisions related to hydraulic fracturing.

Two other pending lawsuits  raising similar separation of powers issues may be affected by the McCrory v. Berger decision. The N.C. State Board of Education sued to challenge Rules Review Commission authority over rules adopted by the Board.  The Board of Education raises several constitutional issues, including a separation of powers violation based on the fact that all Rules Review Commission members are legislative appointees.   The McCrory v. Berger footnote about the Rules Review Commission seems to caution against assuming the court would also find  RRC  appointments to violate separation of powers.   The footnote suggests that the Rules Review Commission’s specific function — to review and object to rules adopted by executive branch agencies — may put it in a different category than the commissions addressed in McCrory v. Berger.

Another pending separation of powers case  in Wake County Superior Court challenges the constitutionality of appointments to the Mining and Energy Commission (MEC). The MEC  seems to fit the McCrory v. Berger template: the commission had authority to take executive actions; the legislature made a majority of commission appointments; and the Governor only had the power to remove a commission member for cause. But the case also presents an additional question: Are actions taken by an unconstitutionally appointed commission void? Over a two-year period, the MEC developed and adopted state rules for hydraulic fracturing.  Plaintiffs in the MEC case (Haw River Assembly and a Lee County property owner) have asked the Wake County judge to rule appointments to the MEC unconstitutional and  void the rulemaking actions already taken by the commission.  The superior court judge had delayed hearing the MEC case until the N.C. Supreme Court issued a decision in McCrory v. Berger. While the Supreme Court decision now provides a roadmap for addressing the separation of powers issue, it doesn’t provide any guidance on how a separation of powers violation affects past commission actions.

Fighting for Control of Environmental Policy

April 8, 2015.   In  North Carolina, most  environmental regulations  are adopted by commissions; the  members serve on a voluntary basis and receive only travel expenses and a minimal  per diem. Serving on a commission is like jury duty — for four years and with homework.   Of the major environmental commissions, the  Environmental Management Commission (EMC) adopts air quality, water quality, solid waste and hazardous waste regulations;  the  Coastal Resources Commission regulates coastal development;  and the Mining and Energy Commission regulates mining and onshore energy exploration and development.  The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)  provides staff support to the commissions,  but the commissions act independently  in adopting environmental rules.  DENR itself has very limited rulemaking authority.

The Governor and  legislative leaders  are currently battling for control of the commissions.  For  decades,  laws creating boards and commissions either gave the Governor exclusive  power to appoint the members  or gave  the Governor a majority of appointments and divided remaining appointments between the state House and Senate.  Since  2010,  the General Assembly has moved to increase legislative influence over the  commissions.  In the last three years, several laws creating new commissions have given the legislature a majority of the appointments.    Reflecting both legislative interest and emerging issues,  the new environment commissions have responsibilities at the crossroads of environmental regulation and energy development.

In 2012, the General Assembly created the Mining and Energy Commission to develop hydraulic fracturing rules. The commission  has eight legislative appointees, three ex officio members (who serve by virtue of holding a specific position — such as the chair of  N.C. State University’s Minerals Research Laboratory Advisory Committee) and only four  Governor’s appointees.  In 2014, the General Assembly continued the practice in creating  the Coal Ash Management Commission to address coal ash contamination;  an Oil and Gas Commission to regulate onshore and offshore energy production;  and a newly constituted Mining Commission.    All three of the new commissions are dominated by legislative appointees.

Late last year, Republican Governor Pat McCrory  filed suit to challenge the constitutionality of provisions in the Coal Ash Management Act of 2014  (creating the Coal Ash Management Commission) and the Energy Modernization Act of 2014  (creating  the  Oil and Gas Commission and Mining Commission). Two former governors, Republican Jim Martin and Democrat Jim Hunt, joined as plaintiffs. In part, the case challenged the  legislature’s authority to appoint a majority of the members serving on executive branch commissions as an unconstitutional  violation of separation of powers. The  lawsuit also raised some lesser separation of powers issues that I won’t go into here.

On March 16, 2015,  a special three-judge panel of Superior Court judges ruled in the governors’ favor in a far-reaching decision that has implications for all of the  commissions involved in environmental policy.   A copy of the court’s order in McCrory v. Berger can be found  here.  Several things to note about the decision:

1. Although the  lawsuit challenged the constitutionality of legislators appointing a majority of the members of a commission with administrative responsibilities, the decision goes further and concludes that it is unconstitutional for the General Assembly to appoint any members of a  commission that exercises “executive” authority.

2. The decision has broader implications than even the judges recognized.   First,  the judges assumed that the Governor appointed all  EMC  members until 2013;  in reality,   the legislature had  appointed at least one-third of the EMC members for decades.  The judges also mistakenly concluded that authority to regulate energy development and mining had rested entirely in the Governor’s appointees to the old Mining Commission and DENR officials  until 2014.   In fact, a 2012 law gave most regulatory authority over onshore energy development and mining to a Mining and Energy Commission also composed largely of legislative appointees.  Those errors caused the judges to mistakenly conclude  that appointees of the Governor  controlled implementation of laws  governing coal ash disposal, energy exploration and development,  and mining until very recently.

The judges’ misunderstanding of the  reality  before  2013-2014 suggests  they may not have fully appreciated the impact of their decision. The practice of making legislative  appointments to the environment commissions has been  longstanding and well-entrenched. Calling into question the constitutionality of commissions with legislative appointees has implications far beyond three commissions too recently created to have taken any significant action.  Which leads to the next problem–

3. The judges did not discuss how the ruling might affect the validity of actions taken by an unconstitutionally appointed commission.  Of the three commissions directly at issue in  the case, two (the Oil and Gas Commission and the new Mining Commission)  do not officially come into being until July 1 2015.  The Coal Ash Management Commission began meeting in  2014, but has not taken any action beyond submitting preliminary reports to the General Assembly.  But a number of other commissions with legislative appointees have made significant regulatory decisions for years.

In January,  Southern Environmental Law Center filed a  lawsuit on behalf of the Haw River Assembly and an individual Lee County property owner separately  challenging  the constitutionality of the Mining and Energy Commission on separation of powers grounds. The lawsuit  explicitly asked  the court to void hydraulic fracturing rules adopted by the MEC based on the constitutional violation. That case is still pending. The EMC, which has had legislatively appointed members for decades,  has been responsible for the entire body of state air quality and water quality rules.

One note– When the N.C. Supreme Court decided in Wallace v. Bone (1982) that the N.C. Constitution did not allow sitting legislators to also  serve  on the Environmental Management Commission, the court did not void EMC actions in which legislative members had participated.  There is probably an inverse relationship between the number of past actions potentially affected and the likelihood that a court will void past actions based on a separation of powers violation.

4. The most immediate impact of the ruling may be on implementation of the Coal Ash Management Act. The General Assembly gave the Coal Ash Management Commission the power to make critical decisions about closure of coal ash impoundments. Under the law, the commission –rather than DENR — will make final decisions prioritizing  coal ash impoundments for closure and approving closure plans. Those decisions will affect both the pace of closure and the environmental impacts. Because of the  ruling in McCrory v. Berger, the Coal Ash Management Commission canceled a planned meeting for March and finds itself in  limbo.

The next critical point in implementation of the Coal Ash Management Act  will come in early 2016 when the Coal Ash Management Commission should  receive DENR’s recommendations on prioritizing coal ash impoundments for closure.   Timelines in the law anticipate a final decision by the commission within 60 days after receiving the DENR recommendations. It isn’t clear that the legal issues  surrounding the commission will be resolved by then. One immediate question  will be  how to keep moving forward on implementation of the Coal Ash Management Act  until those issues have been settled.

Next steps — Legislative leaders have appealed the decision in McCrory v. Berger to  the N.C. Court of Appeals.

N.C. Fracking Disclosure Rule: Update

October 8, 2013. The state’s Mining and Energy Commission (MEC) has still not  moved  forward with a  rule requiring disclosure of chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing fluid, although the commission’s  Environmental Standards Committee approved a draft rule in the spring. The  draft rule  requires a drilling  company to  give  the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)  specific information identifying  all chemicals used  to hydraulically fracture a natural gas well. The draft rule also requires public disclosure of  fracking chemicals,  but allows information about any chemical legitimately designated as a trade secret to be kept confidential and identified to the public only by  chemical “family”.   (The draft rule allows more specific information to be  requested by  a health professional or  by emergency   response personnel  to diagnose and  treat a health condition  or  respond to  an emergency.)

A recap of the controversy around the draft rule. Following committee approval of the draft rule, the Mining and Energy Commission delayed consideration of the rule because of oil and gas industry opposition.  Industry representatives objected to  including trade secret chemicals in  the disclosure to DENR staff. The industry  preferred an earlier rule draft that allowed  drilling companies to withhold information on trade secret chemicals  from state regulators as well as the public unless DENR needed the information to respond to environmental damage or a specific health concern. See an earlier post for more on the MEC decision to delay consideration of the disclosure rule. The important thing to remember — the conflict over the draft rule has to do with providing complete information on hydraulic fracturing chemicals to state environmental regulators.  Every  draft of the chemical disclosure rule has allowed drilling companies to withhold  trade secret information from the public.

The oil and gas industry’s  objection to routine disclosure of trade secret chemicals to DENR staff comes in part out of concern about  the department’s ability to keep the information confidential. The  N.C.  Public Records Act  generally requires state agencies to provide agency records to any citizen on request;  information submitted to DENR by a drilling company would be considered a “public record” under the law.    The Public Records Act, however,  has  existing  provisions to protect the confidentiality of trade secrets and  other DENR programs have successfully used  those provisions  to withhold trade secret information  from the public.  You can find an earlier post about  the N.C. Public Records Act protection for trade secrets  here.

Legislative intervention.  During the legislative session, the N.C. Senate  moved  to resolve the chemical disclosure issue in favor of the oil and gas industry position. A Senate  committee  approved language allowing  drilling companies to withhold information on a trade secret chemical  used in hydraulic fracturing fluid from DENR  unless  the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources requested the information to “respond to a situation that endangers public health or the environment”.  Senators  added the language to House Bill 94 (Amend Environmental Laws), which had already passed the House and was moving through the Senate.  In response to a backlash from both the public and the Mining and Energy Commission itself, the Senate amended the bill to allow DENR staff to review — but not receive — information on trade secret chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing. You can find earlier posts on the two different Senate proposals here and here.  In the end, House Bill 94  died and the General Assembly did not adopt any legislation on disclosure of hydraulic fracturing chemicals.

Back at the Mining and Energy Commission.  When the MEC delayed consideration of the draft chemical disclosure rule, the  commission created a new  Protection of Trade Secrets and Proprietary Information Study Group to look into the issues around disclosure of trade secret information to DENR.  Legislative activity overtook the study group’s work for awhile, but failure of the Senate legislation  puts the issue back in the hands of the MEC without any particular legislative direction.  The MEC will need to resolve on its own the tension between the oil and gas  industry’s desire to withhold trade secret information from environmental regulators and DENR’s need  for information that may be critical to understanding the environmental impacts of hydraulic fracturing. The next meeting of the study group has been scheduled for October 25, 2013 following the MEC meeting.

N.C. Senate Intervenes in Fracking Issue

June 25, 2013: In May, the state’s Mining and Energy Commission (MEC) held up a draft rule requiring disclosure of  chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing  because of objections from lawyers representing energy contracting giant  Halliburton. The draft rule approved by the MEC’s Environmental Standards Committee would have required drilling companies to disclose all of the chemicals used in fracking fluid to staff in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.  Consistent with the state’s Public Records Act, the rule protected trade secret information from disclosure to the public.  Halliburton wanted the ability to withhold trade secret information even from DENR staff unless the information was needed to respond to natural resource damage or a health threat. An earlier post talked about the controversy over disclosure of hydraulic fracturing chemicals and trade secret protection in more detail.

Today, the Senate’s Agriculture and Environment Committee approved a new version of House Bill 94 (Amend Environmental Laws) that resolves the issue in Halliburton’s favor. DENR Assistant Secretary Mitch Gillespie indicated DENR’s support. The new language, in Section 7 of the revised bill (not yet available on the General Assembly website), allows anyone covered by the shale gas legislation to withhold information on a chemical  used in hydraulic fracturing fluid by simply claiming that  the information is a trade secret. Once the drilling operator or supplier claims trade secret protection, DENR can only obtain the  information by request of the Secretary to “respond to a situation that endangers public health or the environment”.  The bill allows the trade secret claim to be challenged in the N.C. Business Court by the Department , another state agency,  a local government emergency response official, or the owner of the well site or property immediately adjacent to the well site.

There are at least two risks in withholding information on the chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing fluid from state regulators until after a problem has arisen: 1. In a real-time emergency — such as a major spill or fire –  it may be difficult to  get the necessary information from the drilling company (or its supplier) quickly enough; and 2.  the length of time between completion of the well and discovery of a hidden  problem (such as groundwater contamination) may make it difficult to get accurate information at all. With respect to groundwater contamination, it is not clear how the state can have an effective water quality monitoring program for hydraulic fracturing operations if the industry can  unilaterally withhold information on the chemicals used in the fracking  fluid.

The  trade secret protection provided for fracking chemicals in House Bill 94 also goes beyond the confidentiality provisions in the state’s Public Records Act. The Public Records Act already requires state agencies to keep  trade secrets confidential and G.S. 62-152(3) provides a definition of “trade secret”.  Although the Public Records Act protects trade secrets from disclosure to the public, it does not allow a business or industry to withhold trade secret information from state regulators. By authorizing drilling companies to withhold information from regulators, House Bill 94 allows  the natural gas industry a degree of  secrecy that appears to be unprecedented under the N.C. Public Records Act.  The House Bill 94 language also restricts challenges to  a trade secret claim by limiting who can bring a challenge.  The Public Records Act allows anyone to challenge a claim that information must be kept confidential as a trade secret; the House Bill 94 language appears to bar challenges by news media, nonprofit organizations, nearby (but not immediately adjacent) property owners and  any number of other interested parties. Another early post discussed the state’s Public Records Act and existing protection for trade secrets.

Halliburton, Fracking and the N.C. Public Records Act

May 3, 2013: The Raleigh News and Observer  reports today on Halliburton’s opposition to a draft North Carolina rule on disclosure of chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing. The Mining and Energy Commission’s Environmental Standards Committee had approved the draft rule for consideration by the full commission today. Commission chair, Jim Womack, told committee members yesterday that the rule would not be taken up by the commission as planned because of objections from Halliburton lawyers.

State law (G.S. 113-391)  specifically directs the  Mining and Energy Commission  to adopt rules for:

“Disclosure of chemicals and constituents used in oil and gas exploration, drilling, and production, including hydraulic fracturing fluids, to State regulatory agencies and to local government emergency response officials, and, with the exception of those items constituting trade secrets, as defined in G.S. 66‑152(3), and that are designated as confidential or as a trade secret under G.S. 132‑1.2, requirements for disclosure of those chemicals and constituents to the public.” G.S. 113-391(a)(5)(h).

You can find more here  on protection of  trade secret information under the  confidentiality provisions of the N.C. Public Records Act.

The draft rule approved by the MEC’s Environmental Standards Committee would have required oil and gas operations to disclose all chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing fluid to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources soon after fracturing the well.  Under the draft rule, information considered to be a “trade secret” under the state’s Public Records Acts would not be disclosed to the public. Based on the news story and other accounts of the committee meeting on Thursday, Halliburton objects to disclosure of trade secret information even to state regulatory staff except in response to actual environmental harm or a specific health concern.

An earlier post talked about the implications of only requiring  disclosure of trade secret information to  regulators after environmental damage or health effects have occurred.  There are at least two potential problems: 1.  in the aftermath of an emergency (such as a spill, leak or fire),  it would take more time to get information to state and local emergency responders;  and 2. groundwater contamination may not be discovered for years after an undetected  leak or spill occurs and lack of complete state records on the chemicals used to fracture wells  will  make it difficult to identify the contamination source.

The current controversy over the chemical disclosure rule raises several legal and policy questions for DENR and the Mining and Energy Commission:

●   Would a rule allowing the operator to withhold trade secret information from state regulators be consistent with G.S. 113-391? The law clearly protects trade secret information from disclosure to the public, but seems to intend disclosure to state regulators and in some circumstances to local emergency response agencies.

●   Is there reason to protect oil and gas industry trade secrets to a greater degree than trade secret information from other industries? Many state agencies receive trade secret information  and the Public Records Act allows that  information to be protected from public disclosure. The Public Records Act does not allow other industries to withhold information  needed by  state regulators on the grounds that the information is a trade secret.

● What is the right balance between the industry’s interest in holding information on hydraulic fracturing chemicals very close and the state’s need to understand and address risks to surface water, groundwater and public health?

● Can the state meet its responsibilities with something less than full disclosure of the chemicals used to fracture oil and gas wells?